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In my thesis, I use only secondary sources. In the first Part I consider the humanist 
inheritance of Jean Jacque Rousseau, by taking into consideration the work of Joshua 
Cohen and Robert Wolker, whereas books by Phillip Rossi, Richard Dean provide 
ground for treatise on Immanuel Kant. In addition, I use text of Ronald A. Shearer, when 
dealing with the notion of economic growth.  
For my hypotheses; the point of departure are the works of the following authors: David 
Orrell, mathematician dealing with predictability of complex systems; David Graber, an 
economist; Dan Ariely, behavioural economist, Robert Nelson, economist; Slavoj Zizek, 
political thinker; and Amartya Sen, moral philosopher.  In addition, the arguments of 
Joseph Persky Deidre McCloskey are used in case of second hypothesis.  
Abstract: 
The thesis elaborates on the potential impact of the financial crisis on the European value 
system. At root of this work lies the debate on the prospectively changed perception of 
human nature, freedom and economic progress, taking into consideration European 
humanist inheritance and contribution of contemporary economic and political thinkers. 
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Introduction & Hypotheses 
As a consequence of the financial crisis, the debate on Economics got to the foreground 
of public interest since even though „it sees itself as a objective, detached, impartial 
science it influences the world it seeks to describe‟
1
 through the defence of a value set. 
Deidre McCloskey points out that ―the values communicated by economic writings are 
often more important that the research results themselves.‖
2
 
The value set defended by orthodox economic view has embodied the belief in the 
economic progress almost in a religious way, reminiscent of: ―the true path to a 
salvation in this world—to a new heaven on earth‖.
3
 Consequently, the demand for a 
new model of a successful society has touched off new counter wave of „religious zeal‟
4
 
with the aim to find a „third way‟.  
Since the notion of „economic growth‟ is to be found in the Preamble of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the debate I consider relevant refers to the aspects of modern economies that are 
either instruments or by-products of economic growth and deteriorate well-being of 
European citizens with the subsequent proposal of alternative measure to GDP per capita. 
Therefore, my first hypothesis is: Economic growth doesn‟t make us happy. 
Robert Bellah emphasizes that: ―We can say that in contemporary society social science 
has usurped the traditional position of theology. It is now social science that tells us 
what kind of creatures we are and what we are about on this planet.‖
5
 Like other social 
sciences, economics works with certain framework of thoughts, in particular the 
construct of economic man – homo economicus to whose features, according to David 
Orrell, are we confronted to fit ourselves. Economic crisis has revealed the insufficiency 
of motivational narrowness of economic man and for the reasons listed above, I would 
                                                          
1
 ORRELL, David (2012). Economyths – How the Science of Complex Systems is Transforming 
Economic Thought. London. Icon. Pg. 214 
2
 NELSON, Robert H (2001). Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and beyond. The 
Pennsylvania State University Press. Pg. 22 
3
 Ibid.,pg.20.  
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like to juxtapose the “ethically conscious human being”
6
 in Adam Smith‟s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and perception of human nature by Jean Jacque Rousseau and 
Immanuel Kant, the proponents of European humanist inheritance. Therefore, my second 
hypothesis is: Motivation of self-interest is not sufficient. 
In the last part of my thesis I will elaborate on the exogeneity of preferences and its 
implication on the perception of freedom in the EU tracing back to the inheritance of 
Immanuel Kant and Jean Jacque Rousseau.  Therefore, my last hypothesis is: We don‟t 
know what our preferences are 
To sum up, I will consider the impact of the economic crisis on the fundamental values 
of EU i.e. perception of human person, freedom and economic growth mentioned in the 
introductory part of the Treaty of Lisbon: First, the Article 1) (a) states “DRAWING 
INSPIRATION from the cultural and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have 
developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human 
person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”
7
; Second the Article 2)3. “The 
Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of 
Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level 
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote 
scientific and technological advance.”
8
 
                                                          
6
 WITZTUM, Amos (1998). A study into Smith‟s conception of the human character - Das Adam Smith 
Problem revisited.  History of Political Economy. Vol. 30, No. 3. Pages 489-513. Quoted in WILSON, 
David; DIXON, William (2006). Das Adam Smith Problem – A critical realist perspective. Leiden. Brill 
NV. Pg. 256 
7
 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [on-line]. [accessed 12-10-14] Available at WWW:  
<http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/Treaties/Treaty_Const.htm> 
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1. EU Values  
In this part, I will deal with the notion of human nature and freedom in Jean Jacque 
Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, the key proponents of European humanist inheritance. At 
the end of this chapter, I will briefly elaborate on the perception of economic growth. 
1.1. Human Nature 
In general sense, ―Human nature refers to the essential and immutable character of all 
human beings.‖
9
 that emphasizes genetic and biological aspects of human persons. For 
the purpose of my thesis, I will deal with the natural goodness of humanity and with the 
role of reason in human lives that during the Enlightenment reached the top point.
10
  
Immanuel Kant was impressed by the French Enlightenment and especially by the ideas 
on human nature of Jean Jacque Rousseau. Therefore, first, I will analyze the Rousseau‟s 
perception of human nature and his belief in natural goodness of humanity; second I will 
focus on Kant‟s notion of humanity. 
1.1.1. Jean Jacque Rousseau 
What lies at the heart of the Rousseau„s conception of human nature is:‖ that man is 
naturally good, and that it is solely by our institutions that men become wicked.‖
11
 
Furthermore ―that we are originally innocent, in that all the vices can all be explained 
without attributing them to ‗‗the human heart‘‘.
12
 
In Rousseau, human beings are endowed with the following potentialities; self-love, 
compassion and a range of cognitive powers.   
According to Cohen, his theory holds that humans are concerned about their own 
wellbeing, they love themselves.  Self-love is not intrinsically comparative meaning that 
                                                          
9
 HEYWOOD, Andrew (2004). Political anthropology: An introduction. Palgrave Macmillan. Pg. 50 
10
  HEYWOOD, Andrew (2004). Political anthropology: An introduction. Palgrave Macmillan. Pg. 21 
11
 Letter to M. de Malesherbes, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, OEuvres compl` etes, vol. 1 (Paris:Gallimard, 
1959)Pg.1135. Quoted in COHEN, Joshua (2010). Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. 
Oxford University Press. Pg.97 
12
 Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979) Ibid.,99.pg.92. Quoted in COHEN, Joshua 
(2010). Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. Oxford University Press. Pg.99 
10 
 
loving myself does not imply that I love myself more than others.
13
  Since human 
persons develop the relations with others, the self-worth is extended to the concern for 
the affirmation and recognition of the self-perceived worth – „amour-propre‟
14
. There are 
two forms of „amour-propre‟; egalitarian and inegalitarian.  
In Rousseau, in the egalitarian form, a person finds the self-perceived worth equal to 
others.  This form is considered to be „instrumentally reasonable‟
15
 because it can be 
approved by other human persons as “true relations”
16
 and does not provoke 
interpersonal conflicts, anxiety etc. which referring Joshua Cohen implies another 
psychological premise: “: that it is ‗‗impossible that each person should prefer us to all 
else and to himself‘‘
17
 In contrast to the egalitarian form of ‟amour-propre‟, the 
inegalitarian form assumes that that a person ranks the self-perceived worth higher than 
anyone else.  Cohen emphasizes that this form naturalizes status inequalities:‖it treats 
them as outward expressions of inner differences of nature and natural worth‖.
18
 Therefore, unlike the egalitarian form, it produces discontent and misery, since it 
requires the abjection of others.  To sum up, the expression of self-love endowment is 
determined by ―rank ordering‖.
19
 
Furthermore, Rousseau„s theory of human nature holds that: ―Each person is moved by 
compassion, a non-derivative predisposition to respond with aversion to the suffering of 
others‖
20
 Cohen presupposes that compared to self-regard, the expression of compassion 











 Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques, in Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 1, trans. Christopher Kelly, 
Judith Bush, and Roger Masters (Hanover,NH: University Press of New England, 1990). Pg.113. quoted in 
COHEN, Joshua (2010). Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. Pg.102 
18
 Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979).Pg. 245.quoted in COHEN, Joshua (2010). 
Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. Pg.103 
19
 COHEN, Joshua (2010). Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. Oxford University Press. 
Pg.105 
20
 Second Discourse (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality), in Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early 
Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) Pg. 
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depends on the scope of concern determined by the exposure to the suffering of others. 
Moreover, he emphasizes the relation between compassion and virtue referring to 
Rousseau: ―…., compassion provides the foundation for a concern for the welfare of 
human beings quite generally, and so provides the affective soil for genuine virtue‖.
21
 
 Except for the affective potentialities (self-regard and compassion), human beings are 
endowed with cognitive powers; „memory, imagination, abstraction, conceptualization, 
self-reflection and reason.‟
22
 Cohen, referring to Rousseau holds that these faculties are 
triggered and developed by the pressure of external circumstances.   To understand 
Rousseau„s belief in Natural goodness, the relation between these powers and motivation 
must be considered. 
Cohen associating development of the cognitive powers (including the „ability to have 
complex thoughts, deliberation and reasoning‟) with Enlightenment assumes that 
combination of these powers and affective aspects of humans i.e. self-love and 
compassion produces an extended scope of passions, which generates more complicated 
forms of motivation.  
Referring to Cohen, Rousseau distinguishes between natural desires as a part of self-love 
reflecting:”the simple impulsion of Nature‘‘
23
 and belief-dependent desires, requiring the 
development of cognitive powers, „dependent on opinions and judgments and therefore 
on the ability to conceptualize‟.
24
 To illustrate, Cohen mentions that extended forms of 
compassions as generosity, clemency, humanity, since these require the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
152-54.  Quoted in COHEN, Joshua (2010). Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. Oxford 
University Press. Pg.104 
21
 Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979).Pg. 253.quoted in COHEN, Joshua (2010). 
Rousseau – A Free Community of Equal.  Quoted in COHEN, Joshua (2010). Rousseau – A Free 
Community of Equals. New York. Oxford University Press. Pg.105 
22
 COHEN, Joshua (2010). Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. Oxford University Press. 
Pg.105 
23
 Second Discourse (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality), in Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early 
Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
Pg.42.quoted in COHEN, Joshua (2010). Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. Oxford 
University Press. 
24




conceptualization of the weak, guilty etc; or love with its moral and physical aspects as 
an: ‖ardent, impetuous…terrible passion that braves all dangers, overcomes all 
obstacles, and in its frenzy seems liable to destroy Mankind‘‘
25
. He assumes that a person 
without developed cognitive powers is not able of emotions such as ―jealousy, 
despondency following rejection, heartbreak.‖
26
 
According to Cohen, „socially shared beliefs‟
27
 resp. Rousseau„s “public opinion”
28
 is 
what determines motivation.  Neglecting the mechanism of belief„s formation, he 
assumes that institutions like social practices or political institutions play key role in 
explaining shared beliefs. He concludes that motivations have social roots. As already 
indicated, belief-dependent desires are conditioned on Enlightenment, which is according 
to Cohen the outcome of social interdependence;”Outside of social interdependence, 
abstracting from the self-conceptions it engenders, we experience neither pride, nor 
hatred, nor a desire for vengeance.‖
29
  
Therefore, the discussion about the natural goodness of humanity departs from what 
humans are before the development of these potentialities.  Cohen distinguishes between 
three schemes. First, prior to the development of cognitive potentialities, humans are 
vicious, but the development can make them virtuous. Second, prior to realization of 
cognitive powers, humans are innocent, but the way potentialities are realized is brutish. 
Third, humans are originally innocent, and unlike the second rendering potentialities 
might be realized in a virtuous way. Since Rousseau rejected that institutions could 
rectify tendencies to human brutality, I will emphasize the second and third rendering. 
                                                          
25
 Second Discourse (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality), in Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early 
Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
Pg.154-5.quoted in COHEN, Joshua (2010). Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. Oxford 
University Press. Pg. 107 
26
 COHEN, Joshua (2010). Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. Oxford University Press. 
Pg.107 
27







Referring to Rousseau, Cohen highlights the relation between enlightenment and vice as 
a starting point of the natural goodness doctrine adding that the expression of cognitive 
powers does not have to lead to vice.  Considering the second scheme, it holds that: ―the 
tendency to evil does lie in latent human powers themselves‖.
30
   Therefore, the third 
rendering lies at the heart of the Natural Goodness doctrine since it presupposes that not 
society but the inappropriate „social arrangements‟
31
 are explanatory to vice-driven 
expression of the human potentialities.  Nevertheless this scheme presupposes that 
human powers can be realized in a virtuous way; ―But such realization requires, inter 
alia, that we develop a sense of duty and motivational supports for it, thus enabling us to 
resist the temptations to vice ingredient in social interdependence.‖
32
 
The permanency of painful experience suggesting wickedness of human nature brings 
Cohen to another question: What particular reasons lurk behind the vice-driven 
expression of human potentialities?  As already indicated, Rousseau rejected Hobbe‟s 
view or choice of evil as outcome of original sin.  
In Rousseau, the vice arises from the belief that acknowledgment of someone‟s worth is 
conditioned on confirming her as a better and is therefore outcome of desire and demand 
for advantage over others or to be treated as a better. This is associated with the 
inegalitarian notion of „amour-propre‟. Cohen emphasizes that demand and desire for 
advantage over others are uprooted in inequality, since it makes people to: ―value the 
things they enjoy only to the extent that the others are deprived of them.‖
33
, and therefore 
be involved in zero-sum games.   Understanding of the relation between inequality and 
inegalitarian „amour-propre‟ requires different forms of inequalities to be introduced.  To 








  Second Discourse (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality), in Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early 
Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 




do so, Cohen assumes the following dichotomy of world; in the first, the political 
institutions acknowledge the equality of citizens i.e. public equality, which is therefore 
not undermined by socio-economic inequalities.  In the second, there is socio-economic 
inequality accompanied by non-affirmed public equality and the natural way to be 
recognized is to win advantage over others, nicely illustrated in Rousseau: ―In Europe, 
the government, the laws, the customs, self-interest, everything places individuals under 
the necessity of deceiving one another, and of doing so incessantly; everything conspires 
to make vice a duty for them; they must be wicked if they are to be wise, since there is no 
greater folly than to provide for the happiness of scoundrels at the expense of one‘s own. 
Among savages, self- interest speaks as insistently as it does among us, but it does not 
say the same things . . . ; nothing leads them to deceive one another‖
34
 
However, Robert Wolker introduces different perception of Rousseau‟s notion of 
inequality referring to the Discourse on Inequality.  The dichotomy is elaborated in a 
following way; on one hand physical resp. natural is out of control, whereas on the other 
hand political or moral is dependent on our choice, with no obvious link between them. 
Therefore, any moral division cannot be conditioned on the physical traits as explained in 
the Social Contract concluding that ―the inequalities produced by Nature must have been 
transformed into such inequalities as were enjoined by man‖.
35
  I will develop this idea 
in chapter ….dealing with the Rousseau„s notion of freedom. 
1.1.2. Immanuel Kant  
For the purpose of my thesis, Kantian analysis of human nature lies at the heart of the 
debate concerning the extent to which humans are driven by rationality or emotionality. 
                                                          
34
 Narcissus, preface, in Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).Pg.101. quoted in COHEN, Joshua (2010). 
Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. Oxford University Press. Pg. 118 
35
 Considerations on the Government of Poland, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political 
Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).Pg.160-
161.quoted in WOLKER, Robert (1995). Rousseau – A very Short Introduction. New York. Oxford 
University Press. Pg.46 
15 
 
His theory holds that human beings are of mixed nature having tensions between duties 
and inclinations, compared, first, to animals that are not able to conceptualize duty or 
reason for action, but have desires and therefore are free of conflicts between moral and 
self-interested reasons or second, to pure rational man, who is not tempted by desires and 
therefore always acts according to moral duty.  Moreover, Kant emphasizes the necessity 
of tradeoffs between immediate and delayed gratification that are human beings facing, 
claiming that the inability to postpone short-term satisfaction reduces human beings to 
animals.
36
    
However, the central problem to Kantian theory of human nature questions human 
motivation to moral obligations in case they are in conflict with self-interested desires. 
An intuitive answer refers to the system of punishments and rewards concerning the 
„realm of law‟
37
 but it does not explain how a person can be motivated  by moral 
reasons and does not create inner virtue, i.e. the good will to do the right for its own sake 
since unlike Utilitarian approach: “No ethical duties can be enforced through rewards 
and punishments of any sort without violating the rights of free beings‖.
38
  
  Richard Dean claims that contemporary readers are increasingly emphasizing humanity 
formulation at the centre of Kantian ethics, since Categorical Imperative‟s 
universalizability formulation as a fundamental moral  is problematic.  According to 
them, Kant identifies rational nature with humanity as an inner property of a person, 
which is considered to be a fundamental principle of morality; therefore, morality is 
required from all rational beings.  However, Dean claims that humanity is not a feature of 
all rational beings since: ―…. ‗humanity‘ is Kant‘s name for the more fully rational 
nature that is only possessed by a being who actually accepts moral principles as 
                                                          
36
 STEVENSON, Leslie; HABERMAN, David (1998). Ten Theories of Human Nature. New York. Oxford 







providing sufficient reasons for action.‖
39
   According to him, humanity refers to the 
good will that prioritizes moral obligations to self-interest.  
But what is good will? Dean refers to Lewis White Beck„s commentary on Kant‟s 
Critique of Practical Reason: “An action having this motive (the motive of duty) is moral, 
and a being who acts from this motive has a good will.‖
40
  Therefore, good will refers to 
actions required by duty. However, the very basic definition could be found in Kant„s 
Groundwork: ―…a good will is the will of an agent who acts on moral principles.‖
41
  In 
Metaphysics of Morals Kant considers other aspects of the good will assuming that it 
refers to the power of choice i.e. Willkür.  However, since humans are not perfectly 
rational, they can use Willkür in a way that is not morally acceptable, only hypothetical 
„holy will‟  of perfect rational man guided only by reason is free of inclinations, Kant 
does not assume that human beings dispose of this kind of will.
42
 
As already indicated Kant presupposes that human beings are of mixed nature since they 
are not perfectly rational.  Notwithstanding their inclinations motivated by self-love 
humans are predisposed to respect moral laws. Therefore, in Kant, the good will refers to 
a situation when an agent is committed to act morally even though it implies the 
subordination of her inclinations prioritizing morality.
43
  
                                                          
39
 DEAN, Richard (2006). The Value of Humanity in Kant‟s Moral Theory. New York. Oxford University 
Press.pg.6 
40
 Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant‘s Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960).Pg. 41. Quoted in DEAN, Richard (2006). The Value of Humanity in Kant‟s Moral 
Theory. New York. Oxford University Press. Pg. 19 
41
 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Thomas E. Hill, Jr., and Arnulf Zweig (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). Translated from Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in volume iv of Kant‟s 
gesammelte Schriften, pg. 401.  Quoted in DEAN, Richard (2006). The Value of Humanity in Kant‟s 
Moral Theory. New York. Oxford University Press. Pg.19 
42
 DEAN, Richard (2006). The Value of Humanity in Kant‟s Moral Theory. New York. Oxford University 
Press. Pg.19-20 
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However, this commitment is not robust, since according to Kant there is “natural 
propensity of the human being to evil”
44
, which can imply prioritizing of the principle of 
self-love over the moral law. According to Dean, Kant distinguishes between 
„depravity‟
45
 as a full subordination of morality to self-love and „impurity‟
46
 as 
recognition of morality only if it is in accordance with self-love. Furthermore, as 
indicated, notwithstanding human beings have Willkür to act in accordance with 
morality; there is “weakness of the human heart ... or in other words, the frailty of human 
nature‖
47
, whose consequence is that human beings with good will act morally wrong. 
Therefore, Dean claims that the good will cannot be associated solely with choice of 
actions that are morally worthy.  
However, the other commentators do not define humanity as a good will; they claim it is 
a possession of “all minimally rational agents‖.
48
 Dean distinguishes between three 
categories of „minimal readings of humanity‟
49
. In the first one, humanity 
interchangeably used as Willkür, receives support e.g. from Christine Korsgaard‟s seeing 
the main feature of humanity as a ability to set ends. 
In the second one, apart from Willkür and Wille i.e. ―the power to legislate moral 
principles to oneself‖
50
, humanity is defined as the ability to act in accordance with 
Hypothetical imperative, „the ability to compare one‘s various contingent ends and 
organize them into a systemic whole and the ability to employ theoretical reason to 
                                                          
44
 Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). Pg. 21. Quoted in DEAN, Richard (2006). The Value of Humanity in 
Kant‟s Moral Theory. New York. Oxford University Press. Pg.21 
45
 DEAN, Richard (2006). The Value of Humanity in Kant‟s Moral Theory. New York. Oxford University 
Press.Pg.21 
46
 Ibid.,pg. 21 
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 Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). Pg.29. Quoted in DEAN, Richard (2006). The Value of Humanity in 
Kant‟s Moral Theory. New York. Oxford University Press.Pg.21 
48
 DEAN, Richard (2006). The Value of Humanity in Kant‟s Moral Theory. New York. Oxford University 
Press.Pg.24 
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, therefore in the context of the second category, Dean assumes 
that humanity is identified with abilities possessed by minimally rational human beings.  
According to Dean, this category receives support e.g. from Allen Wood, who assumes 
that  rational abilities without relation to morality.  Same as Kosgaard, Wood emphasizes 
the ability to set ends as a central feature of humanity.  
In the third category, Dean interprets humanity as the ability to act in accordance with 
morality, which refers to Willkür and Wille. However, since there are tensions between 
inclinations and duties, Willkür and Wille are accompanied by what Kant calls 
„Reverence‟
52
 (Achtung). According to Dean, considering Groundwork and Second 
Critique, „Reverence‟ is defined as a: ―a feeling that arises when we apprehend the 
reason-giving force of the moral law, and how our inclinations pale in importance 
compared to moral requirements‖
53
 and therefore explains why people are motivated to 
act in accordance with duty.  This category is represented e.g. by Thomas E. Hill, who 
conforms the approach that humanity is defined as the ability to act in accordance with 
morality. In „Humanity as an End in Itself‟
54
 he assumes basic notion of humanity 
associated with powers such as: ―to act for reasons in general; to follow principles of 
prudence (hypothetical imperatives); to set ends; to understand the world by using 
theoretical reason; and to legislate moral principles to oneself‖
55
.  According to him, the 
self-legislation and acceptance of principles of morality are equal and therefore anyone 
having humanity has the ability to act in accordance with morality  
1.2. Freedom 
Terms freedom and liberty are used as synonyms by social a political thinkers. According 
to Isiah Berlin, there are two basic notions of liberty; negative and positive. The former 













consists in „no barriers, obstacles or interference of others‟
56
 to individual‟s acting and 
therefore in the availability of action, whereas the latter refers to the possibility of actions 
―in such a way as to take control of one's life and realize one's fundamental purposes‖.
57
 
In general, liberal philosophers assume a negative perception of liberty given to 
individuals, therefore are in favor of limitation of the state, whereas their critiques‟ 
arguments are embodied in their perception of freedom as „self-realization or self-
determination‟
58
 ascribed rather to individuals as members of collectives or to 
collectives, therefore demanding relatively extended intervention of the state. For the 
purpose of my thesis I find it necessary to deal with the positive notion of liberty more in 
depth.  
As already suggested, unlike negative liberty positive refers to the presence of „, self-
mastery, self-determination or self-realization‟
59
 as conditions enabling recognition of 
individuals‟ true interests. Therefore according to Isaiah Berlin, the following question 
lies at the heart of the positive notion of liberty: ―What, or who, is the source of control 
or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that.”
60
, 
whereas the negative notion of liberty refers to: ―What is the area within which the 
subject — a person or group of persons — is or should be left to do or be what he is able 
to do or be, without interference by other persons?‖
61
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1.2.1. Jean Jacque Rousseau  
For the purpose of my thesis, I will deal with the following notions of freedom 
elaborated in Rousseau; natural, civil and moral. As already suggested in Chapter 1.1.1 
according to Wolker, Rousseau concludes that humans are born with reputed unequal 
traits of intelligence and strength being driven by impulses of appetites.  Therefore, in the 
Social Contract, the natural liberty is defined as an absence of constraints: “unlimited 
right to anything which tempts him and which he is able to attain”
62
, whereas in the 
Discourse on Inequality: ―in terms of free will and the absence of control over us by our 
animal promptings”
63
 To sum up, for the unlimited natural liberty jeopardizes the safety 
of other humans and accepting that security is valued over freedom, Rousseau claims that 
the natural liberty has to be transferred to the authority to keep peace among them. In 
Emile, Rousseau emphasizes that: ―what is forbidden to us by conscience is not 
temptations but rather letting ourselves be conquered by temptations.‖
64
 However, 
according to Wolker, this process depicted in the Social Contract as a metamorphosis of 
men subjecting its physical independence is what is in the Discourse on Inequality 
described as “a fatal step towards vice”.
65
  In the Social Contract, Rousseau claims that: 
―Anyone who dares to institute a people must feel capable of, so to speak, changing 
human nature…the more these natural forces are dead and destroyed, the greater and 




                                                          
62
 Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. and trans. 
Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).pg. 427 
63
 WOLKER, Robert (1995). Rousseau – A very Short Introduction. New York. Oxford University Press. 
Pg. 78 
64
 Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979).Pg.445.Quoted in WOLKER, Robert (1995). 
Rousseau – A very Short Introduction. New York. Oxford University Press 
65
 WOLKER, Robert (1995). Rousseau – A very Short Introduction. New York. Oxford University Press. 
Pg. 78 
66
 Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed.and trans. 
Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Quoted in COHEN, Joshua (2010). 
Rousseau – A Free Community of Equals. New York. Oxford University Press. Pg.35 
21 
 
According to Wolker, Rousseau believed that by subjection of the natural liberty to the 
authority (i.e. entering into the Social Contract) and the „engagement in self-rule‟
67
 the 
men‟s freedom could be increased. ―beyond that of the mere physical independence of 
savages in their original state‖
68
, for in return for natural liberty, men win civil and 
moral liberty and therefore, men‟s natural in  is substituted by moral and 
legitimate equality. Furthermore, Wolker claims that unlike the other Social Contract 
philosophers prior to Rousseau, he assumes that joining Social Contract enables 
“fulfilment of ambitions they could not even have entertained without it”
69
 because men 




As far as civil liberty is concerned, unlike natural liberty it is characterized by the 
possibility of acting that is limited by general will. There is a discourse about the 
possible definitions of general will; Wolker emphasizes that in the Discourse on Political 
Economy, Rousseau introduces general will as a body „serving as a source of laws and 
standards of justice‟
71
, whereas in the Social Contract, it is defined in relation to „public 
interest, common good and to individual will of citizens to achieve that good, which is 
often contradictory to citizen‟s interest‟.
72
  Therefore, according to him, the general will 
should not be interchangeably used as the will of all i.e. sum of interests being in 
conflict. 
Cohen referring to the Social Contract presupposes the limitation of the civil liberty by 
general will as well. He assumes that subjection of the natural rights to the authority 
establishes a society in which individual ―puts his person and his full power in common 
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under the supreme direction of the general will‖
73
. In such a society limited by the 
general will, the authority reposes in the shared perception of the common good that is 
shared among citizens. Furthermore, he elaborates the conditions under which an 
association of persons could be regulated by general will.  
The first condition refers to the following question: How an association of persons with 
different interests can be regulated by general will?  In the Social Contract, Rousseau 
presupposes the overlap of particular interests ―What these different interests have in 
common is what forms the social bond, and if there were not some point on which all 
interests agree, no society could exist‖
74
 pointing to peace and security.  
According to Cohen, the second condition concerns the shared perception of the common 
good. Even though Rousseau did not specify its definition, Cohen referring to Rousseau 
suggests common good‟s limitations in the following way; first, Rousseau denied 
classical utilitarianism, in the Social Contract, he states that to “sacrifice an innocent man 
for the sake of the multitude is one of the most execrable maxims that tyranny ever 
invented”
75
; second, he emphasizes that all aspects of „general will should oblige or favor 
Citizens equally‟ and that: ―The first and greatest public interest is always justice. All 
wish the conditions to be equal for all, and justice is nothing but this equality.‖
76
 
According to Cohen, the third condition presupposes that citizens ―have reasonable 
confidence that the institutions conform to their shared conception of the common 
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 give priority to reasons supporting these institutions over those that reflect 
private will of individuals or groups. 
  Notwithstanding Rousseau„s liberal critics find his perception of general will rather 
collectivists, according to Wolker, Rousseau seems to divert indoctrination of men 
notwithstanding his famous statement: “whoever refuses to obey the general will… shall 
be forced to be free.”
78
 
Considering the moral liberty, Rousseau assumes in the Social Contract that under 
condition laws are prescribed by men who are subjected to them, laws and liberty 
progress simultaneously.  
Isiah Berlin along with other liberal thinkers emphasized the danger of authoritarianism 
accompanying the positive notion of liberty. At the heart of his critique lies the divided 
self; higher moral and rational self and lower self driven by irrational impulses. Taking 
into account that some of the individuals are allegedly more rational than others and 
therefore have better knowledge about what their and other‟s interests are, they are 
allowed to force allegedly less rational individuals to ―realize their true selves‖
79
.  
According to Berlin, some positive liberty thinkers even admit that the satisfied slave is 
free since her desires are removed, which may be an outcome of external forces such as 
brainwashing thus far away from the exercising of freedom.  Moreover, considering that 
defenders of positive liberty tend to identify the interest of the whole with the interests of 
the individuals, the individuals can be coerced to promote these common interests, 
because the coercion would not be necessary in case they are as rational as coercers.
80
 
Berlin claims that: ―Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes 
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1.2.2. Immanuel Kant 
Since Kant was inspired by Rousseau, his idea of freedom goes beyond Berlin‟s negative 
conception of liberty as well. At root of his perception of liberty lies the autonomy of 
rational human wills, the practical freedom and causal spontaneity. However, for the 
purpose of my thesis I would like to deal with causal spontaneity and practical freedom 
only.  
At the heart of the Kant‟s notion of Practical freedom is the solution to the inner conflict 
between inclinations and duties. However, it should be mentioned that this “natural 
propensity of the human being to Evil”
82
 is not ascribed to animal or rational nature but 
to the social arrangements.  Kant claims that a moral agent is considered to be practically 
free in case her “proper self”
83
 is not coerced by external forces, therefore her actions are 
voluntary and self-determined as stated in the Critique of Pure Reason: “Freedom, in its 
practical sense, is the independence of our will from coercion through impulses of 
sensibility”.
84
 Kant distinguishes between animal and human will; concluding that unlike 
the former, the latter is ―is affected pathologically (by impulses of sensibility)‖,
85
 which 
implies that compared to animals, men dispose of faculty of self-determination meaning 
that impulses of sensibility can be potentially refused by their will determined not by 
necessity but by affection. There is a connection between this faculty and theory of 
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voluntary action in Aristotle, which is nicely illustrated in the Nicomachean ethics by a 
man being taken away by the wind making his acting involuntary.
86
 
According to Rossi, before the concept of autonomy was introduced in Groundwork, 
causal spontaneity took precedence in Kant‟s discussions relating to freedom.
87
 At root 
of his notion of causal spontaneity and lies concern about freedom being endangered by 
phenomenal determinism expressed in the following questions: ―If I am caused, how can 
I have control over myself?‖
88
 and therefore “How can I avoid being caused 
externally?”
89
  Kant‟s response lies in spontaneity. He distinguishes between the absolute 
spontaneity with no cause prior to action that is non-existent and causal spontaneity that 
is self-caused referring to any action, whose ―causality… does not depend, according to 
a law of nature, on another cause, by which it is  determined in time‖.
90
  In general, we 




Notwithstanding our tendency explain the world around us by means of cause-effect 
relations, possibility of causal spontaneity not completely neglected. Yet Kant neglects 
that humans cannot experience causal spontaneity, its impossibility is not approved.  
1.3. Economic growth 
Even though there is a long debate on the concept of economic growth, according to 
Ronald A. Shearer, „the term growth acquired a connotation of quantitative increase‟
92
. 
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Analogically, there is a widespread disagreement about the relevant measure of growth 
and „the only unifying element is that economic growth should be measured by the 
contribution of economic activity to the human welfare‟
93
. Nowadays, according to 
Shearer, taking the form of the satisfaction of wants of individuals that reflects the 
utilitarian traditions: ―The world proceeds very much on the assumption that the flow of 
goods is an accurate indicator of economic welfare‘s‖.
94
 Therefore, per capita national 
income is the measure most widely used. According to Orrell, nowadays, GDP reports 
are expected almost with religious respect.  
2. Hypotheses 
2.1. Hypothesis 1: Economic growth doesn’t make us happy 
2.1.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will deal with the first hypothesis: „Economic growth doesn‟t make us 
happy‟ and its possible impact on European Value System, in particular on Article 2)3 of 
the Preamble of the Lisbon Treaty emphasizing “sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability―
95
 by considering the following 
question posed by Slavoj Zizek in his book First as Tragedy then as Farce:‖How is it, 
however, that in our era of spiritualized hedonism, when the goal of life is directly 
defined as happiness, the number of people suffering from anxiety and depression is 
exploding?‖
96
Therefore, in this chapter, I will focus on the paradox of the abundance of 
material wealth unparallel in modern history in rich countries on the one hand and 
declining measures of happiness compared to those in the poorer countries on the other. 
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To do so, first, I would like to consider the relationship between income and happiness. 
Second, I will focus on the role of debts in the growth/ happiness relation referring to the 
question: ―What does it mean when we reduce moral obligations to debts?‖
97
 Third, I 
will assess limits of our ability to transform income into pleasure, in particular, the sense 
of discontent. Fourth, our vulnerability to succumb to the sense of discontent will be 
introduced.   Fifth, I will deal with the family decline as an obverse side of economic 
growth. Sixth, the primary role of happiness will be questioned. 
2.1.2. ‘Can we really put a price tag on happiness?’98 
Before considering the relation between money and happiness, it should not be omitted 
that the „quantities‟ of income (money) and happiness are completely different; Orrell 
puts emphasis on the dissipation of happiness compared to lasting nature of money, 
whose unspent proportion is accumulated and results in global wealth inequalities. 
Moreover, happiness is considered to be more democratic and stable, supported by 
Jevons‟: "I have a lurking suspicion that the sum total of a person's enjoyment is 
generally equal to what we should call in mathematics a 'constant quantity:"
99
  This 
approach is represented by set-point theories of happiness that presuppose that level of 
happiness we experience is stable and dependent on genetic disposition, personality trait, 
culture etc.  
There is a long debate concerning the correlation between income and well-being.  
Easterlin Paradox „postulates that increase in average income does not raise average 
well-being‟,
100
 whereas its modified versions assume that there is a certain threshold 
beyond which the correlation between two variables disappears; Di Tella and 
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There is a long debate concerning the „threshold‟ as well; e.g. according to Layard the 
threshold is at 20000 USD GDP per capita, whereas Frey and Stutzer argue for 10000 
USD GDP per capita. 
102
 
However, what „statistical data in general show are diminishing marginal gains in 
subjective well-being‟
103
; as the income increases the correlation at some point becomes 




What are the reasons for this tendency? Orrell concludes that ―Some aspects of our 
economic system seem designed to make us unhappy.‖
105
  I will deal with these 
determinants in the following subchapters. 
2.1.3. Debts 
Happiness is dependent on many factors and even though the relationship between 
money and pleasure is often vague, according to a survey made by American Psychology 
Association in 2007 ‟for 73 percent of respondents, money was quoted as the significant 
source of stress‟
106
. Economic growth in modern economies is undoubtedly conditioned 
on deficit spending; ―Consumer debt is the lifeblood of our economy‖
107
 David Greaber  
asserts  in his book Debt that for hundreds of years majority of humans were told they 
were debtors, that was often source of resistance and humiliation; ―Tell people that they 
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are potential equals who have failed, and that therefore, even what they do have they do  
not deserve, that it isn't rightly theirs, and you are much more likely to inspire rage.‖
108
 
One of the key questions in David Graeber‟s book Debt is: ―What does it mean when we 
reduce moral obligations to debts?‖
109
 According to him, the parallel struggle between 
rich and poor, creditors and debtors formed our perception of what is right and wrong. 
He alleges that in the secular world, morality encompasses to great extent complying 
with the obligations to others. However, according to Greaber, the problem is that we 
tend to identify obligations with debts resp. with quantifiable sum of money.  
Dan Ariely emphasizes in his book Predictably Irrational that we live in two worlds. The 
first one is „warm and fuzzy‟
110
 world of social exchanges that includes exchange of gifts 
with no instant payback required, giving pleasure to all participants.  The second one is 
of „sharp-edged‟
111
 market exchanges encompassing calculations about „prices, interests, 
cost-and-benefits etc.‟
112
 Ariely‟s experiments show that first: ―for market norms to 
emerge, it is sufficient to mention money‖
113
 and second: ―when a social norm collides 
with a market norm, the social norm goes away for a long time.‖
114
 
Therefore ―Our ability to slip easily into market norms is perhaps because they have 
become so established throughout our society that they are now the default mode.‖
115
 
Unfortunately, being in the market norms is not what makes us happy.   
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2.1.4. ‘Non-repressive hedonism’116 
In Orrell‟s words, neoclassical economics perceives income as a reservoir of utility ―a 
kind of potential energy that can be transformed into pleasure just by spending it‖.
117
 
Furthermore, he asserts that neoclassical perception of working day is reminiscent of 
Joule‟s experiment: ―You lift up a heavy weight (perform labour in exchange for money), 
then release the weight (drop some cash), thus stirring and warming the bucket of water 
(your soul).‖
118
 But are we able to transform income into pleasure resp. does it really 
warm our soul or are we left only agitated? 
 Sedlacek points out that nowadays economies do not have finite goal letting people 
repose in; one task finished implies start of another one, since as Orrell claims we are 
offered „eternal happiness‟
119
, ―if we can just work harder and upgrade our lifestyles‖.
120
 
The term rest acquired negative connotation and is only for those weak unable to cope 
with the tempo of the present time.
121
 According to Sedlacek, it seems as if we are not 
able to appreciate stationary affluence.  Therefore my answer to the question listed above 
is „yes‟, we are rather left agitated. In the following paragraph, I would like to justify my 
answer. 
„Imperative of our time is the economic growth‟
122
 and we are convinced ―that material 
success equates to happiness‖.
123
 ‗Sense of discontent became the driver of economic 
performance‟
124
. But how is this feeling developed and nourished? 
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According to Frank Knight and George Stigler, the sense of discontent seems to be a 
rather innate feature of individuals; the former asserts that: ―It is human nature to be 
more dissatisfied the better of one is‖
125
, the latter similarly concludes that: ―The chief 
thing which the common-sense individual wants is not satisfactions for the wants he had, 
but more and, and better wants.‖
126
. Nelson elaborates on Campbell‟s term 
“inexhaustible wants”
127
 .Sedlacek referring to Patinkin: alleges that our desires can‟t be 
satisfied and claims that it looks like as if: ―history has shown that Western society 




Another cause can be seen in the concept introduced by Slavoj Zizek „non-repressive 
hedonism‟
129
 defined as ―the constant provocation we are exposed to, enjoining us to go 
right to the end and explore all modes of jouissance‖,
130
 product of reversal of Kant‟s 
“Du kannst, denn du sollst”
131
.  He claims that enjoyment has acquired the status of an 
obligation and duty; ―the only functioning ideology is consumerism‖.
132
  But why do we 
succumb so easily? 
2.1.5. ‘Unnaturally natural’133 
The most intuitive cause can be seen in our tendency to identify material success with 
happiness, amplified by our inability to evaluate wealth in absolute terms, ―…rather, we 
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focus on the relative advantage of one thing over another, and estimate value 
accordingly.‖
134
 But this conclusion assuming that money and happiness are similar 
quantities is too simplistic. David Orrell recognizes both Sen‟s and Ariely‟s approach 
and adds that we rather compare ourselves with those who are richer, through media. 
However, referring to the survey made in the US from 1983 to 2003, happiness tends to 




David Orrell‟s answer to the question: ―What is economic machine maximizing?‖
136
  is 
„nothing‟.  My answer is „human effort‟. Rousseau believed that subjection (i.e. entering 
into a social contract) of our natural liberty enables: ―fulfilment of ambitions they could 
not even have entertained without it”
137
. Furthermore, again in the Social contract, he 
alleges that: ―Anyone who dares to institute a people must feel capable of, so to speak, 
changing human nature…the more these natural forces are dead and destroyed, the 
greater and more lasting are the acquired ones….‖
138
 But what does imply entering into 
a social contract nowadays? 
Apparently the snappiest characterization lurks behind Isiah Berlin‟s question regarding 
positive liberty: ―What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can 
determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?‖
139
  „The unprecedented 
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development of technologies including the „control of human biology‟ and reproduction 
made the creation of a New Man (with changed human nature) a realistic prospect.‟
140
  
Sedlacek points out that the fact that we lost harmony with nature and became 
„unnaturally natural‟ and „naturally unnatural‟ is the principal cause of the sense of 
discontent we face nowadays.  Consequent generation of „existential unrest, 
externalization of feelings of insufficiency and substitution of „be‟ for „have‟ lies in the 
core of modern economies.
141
  
Therefore, there is another Berlin‟s question that acquired a new dimension: ―What is the 
area within which the subject — a person or group of persons — is or should be left to 
do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?‖
142
 
Even though there are many interpretations of Rousseau‟s ―whoever refuses to obey the 
general will… shall be forced to be free.‖
143
 he believed that men are naturally good and 




However, Rousseau emphasized that by a subjection of the natural liberty to the 
authority, the men‟s freedom (positive notion of liberty) could be increased; since it 
enables: ―fulfilment of ambitions they could not even have entertained without it‖.
145
 
Isiah Berlin warned against the danger of authoritarianism that could accompany positive 
notion of liberty, emphasizing that allegedly some individuals are more rational than 
others and therefore have better knowledge about what their and other‟s interests are, 
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they are allowed to force allegedly less rational individuals to “realize their true 
selves”.
146
  But what does it mean to „realize true selves‟ at present time?  Sedlacek 
claims that:‖according to Zizek, it seems that us, humans need to be shown, for what we 
should be looking for.‖
147
   
 
2.1.6. Family decline 
According to Bruce Headey‟s study non-zero sum goals such as commitment to family 
are important determinants of life satisfaction and happiness.
148
 The decline of family as 
an „obverse side‟
149
 of growth falls within negative aspects of modern economies.  
Undoubtedly, there are many causes of this tendency but the point of departure of this 
subchapter will be the following; even though „it (economics) itself as a objective, 
detached, impartial science it influences the world it seeks to describe‟
150
 through the 
defense of a value set. Deidre McCloskey points out that ―the values communicated by 
economic writings are often more important that the research results themselves.‖
151
  
Sedlacek alleges that nowadays, we tend consider the fuzzy world of social exchanges 
including love and friendly relations unproductive.  I think there are two different 
problems; first, we tend to evaluate productivity of the social exchanges from the 
utilitarian perspective and therefore second, market norms take precedence in domains of 
social exchange. I will try to justify the former statement by using concepts introduced 
by Gary Becker, a pioneer of economic analysis of family decision making. 
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Similarly to Orrell, Sedlacek indicates the tendency to reduce humanity to units of 
consumption and production. Becker restricting the decisions about marriage and 
relations made in families to the “acts of consumer choice‖
152
 is very far from disproving 
Sedlacek‟s suggestion.  For the purpose of my thesis, I will put emphasis only on 
considerations about marriage and sex. 
According to Nelson, Becker assumed that people decide about getting married after 
juxtaposing utility of being married and single. Furthermore, he perceived marriage as 
social institution and introduces the term „gain from marriage‟ as “the difference between 
married output and the sum of single outputs”
153
. For Becker, mutual dedication in 
marriage is a way of maximizing yields of investments. 
Orrell emphasizes that love among other qualities can‟t be expressed in terms of short-
term utility. However, Becker defines love as ―deriving of utility from the utility of 
another.”
154
 Notwithstanding its secondary importance on the marriage market, Becker 
assumes that marriages involving love are relatively more efficient and productive.   
Unlike Posner, Becker‟s analysis did not take into consideration the role of sex in 
marriage. In the Sex and Reason, Posner concluded that one of the most important way 
spouses tend to compensate each other is by means of provision of sexual services. 
Furthermore, he emphasizes that marriage in fact is reminiscent of prostitution.   
It seems as if even robots in Karel Capek‟s RUR at the end become more humane than 
agents presented in Becker‟s and Posner‟s analysis;  
―Helena: I will go. 
Alquist: Where will you go? 
Helena: You can dissect me. 
Alquist: You? You‘re beautiful, Helena. That would be such a shame. 
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Helena: I am going in there. (Primus stand in her way). Let me go, Primus! Let me go in 
there. 
Primus: Now you can‘t go in there, Helena. Please get away from here, you shouldn‘t be 
here at all. 
Helena: Primus, if you go in there I‘ll jump out of the window, I‘ll jump out the window! 
Primus: (holding on to her) I won‘t let go of you (to Alquist) You‘re not going to kill 
anyone, old man! 
Alquist: Why not? 
Primus: Because….because…we belong to each other. 
Alquist: You‘re quite right (opens door, center) It‘s alright. Go, now. 
Primus: Go where? 
Alquist: (whisper) Whenever you like. Helena, take him away (pushes her out) go on 




2.1.7. Happiness as the ultimate goal? 
At the beginning of this chapter, I refer to Zizek‟s quote: “…when the goal of life is 
directly defined as happiness…‖
156
 But why should happiness be considered as the 
ultimate goal? Same as in the previous chapter my point of departure of this subchapter 
will be the following Orrell‟s statement: ―It is as if we are contorting ourselves to fit the 
model of rational economic man.‖
157
 
Welfare economic places happiness at the center of evaluation, ―seeing it as a sole guide 
to human well-being‖.
158
 This discipline has been long driven by the by utilitarianism 
                                                          
155
 CAPEK,Karel (1920).R.U.R, translated by David Willye 
156
 ZIZEK, Slavoj (2009). First as Tragedy, Then as Farce. London: Verso. Pg.35 
157
 ORRELL, David (2011). Economyths – How the Science of Complex Systems is Transforming 
Economic Thought. London. Icon. Pg.211 
158








At this point, to understand the origins of welfare economics, the circumstances 
accompanying the invention of neoclassical economics should be elaborated. According 
to Orrell, neoclassical economics with its main aim to make people happy was invented 
in the time of most exciting scientific period in history. Hermann Helmholtzt studying 
the movement of muscles converting food into labor concluded in 1845 that ―mechanics, 
heat, electricity, magnetism, and light were all different aspects of a single type of energy 
that was at all times conserved.‖
160
 Orrell suggests that economists applied Hemholtz‟s 
notion of muscle movement to humans converting labor into utility, therefore 
substituting physical with economic quantities, completely neglected that humans are not 
machines.  At this time, utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham with its greatest happiness 
principle was already invented and utility was perceived as a „single type of energy‟
161
.  
The economy was “nothing other than a mechanism for maximizing (a word invented by 
Bentham) utility-a kind of giant pleasure machine.”
162
  
According to Amartya  Sen, happiness is not the only thing we appraise, but the 
capability to be happy is the important part of our life. He claims that our sense of 
happiess is influenced by the successes and failures to achieve objectives that we value, 
no matter what they are.  Therefore, freedom is considered valuable for the following 
reasons: first, it give us opportunity to achieve what we value. Second, it enables us to 
choose freely what we value, as we want to be sure that our decision making process is 
not restrained by limits imposed by others.  He distinguishes between opportunity aspect 
of freedom and process aspect of freedom.  The opportunity aspect of freedom is linked 
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with capability based thinking. According to him, capability approach is concerned with 
our ability to achieve combinations of functionings that we have reason to value.  Sen 
claims that wealth is not valuable for its sake since capability approach emphasizes the 
ability to do what we have reason to value and it focuses on the opportunities rather than 
on means. Sen highlights the importance of good health and overall wellness by 
assuming that handicaps and illnesses limits our capability to do what we have reason to 
value. 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn states in his book Cancer Ward that:‖One should never direct 
people towards happiness, because happiness too is an idol of the market-place. One 
should direct them towards mutual affection.‖
163
   
2.1.8. Black Swans 
Orrell emphasizes the negative emotional impacts of shock events such as financial 
crises. But what makes these events unpredictable? To answer the question, I will 
introduce the concept invented by Nassim Taleb, Black Swan. According to him, an 
event with three following attributes can be called a Black Swan:‖First, it is an outlier, 
as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can 
convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite 
of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after 
the fact, making it explainable and predictable.‖
164
   
To answer the question of general unpredictability of Black Swans such as Financial 
crisis, I will deal with the third part of the triplet of opacity referring to: “the 
overvaluation of factual information‖.
165
  
Taleb introduces two states of our world, Mediocristan and Extremistan. In former, 
inequalities are generated by zero-sum games, whereas in the later the distribution is 
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more equal.  In Extremistan, small  number  of extreme events determining the total 
outcome means that the economies are vulnerable to AD-AS shocks, whereas in 
Mediocristan, single instance could hardly affect total output. Therefore, we can learn 
from what we have measured and knowledge derived from the data increases with the 
information supplied, because it is not possible to have Black Swan randomness, whereas 
in the Extremistan, what we can know from the data is increased „at an unknown rate‟
166
.  
To sum up: ‖Mediocristan is where we must endure the tyranny of the collective, the 
routine, the obvious, and the predicted; Extremistan is where we are subjected to the 
tyranny of the singular, the accidental, the unseen, and the unpredicted.‖
167
  
According to Taleb, this approximation shouldn‟t be platonified but his claim „modern 
world being Extremistan‟
168
 seems to be contradictory. He maintains that almost 
everything in the world including elements of our existence can be explained by small 
number of extreme events (e.g. rise of Hitler, demise of Soviet bloc, spread of Internet, 
Russian financial default in 1998  all followed dynamics of Black Swan).   
But why do we fail to predict events such as Financial crisis? In general, considering that 
our predictions are based on projections of the past events to the future, then: ―How we 
can figure out properties of the (infinite) unknown based on the (finite) known?‖
169
  But 
is there really a known resp. finite known? According to Taleb, there are two ailments of 
human minds related to our forecasting ability. First, when deriving future from the past, 
our minds are limited by the „deterministic extension of the perception of the past‟
170
 
neglecting the role of chance and at the same time ignoring what we thought about the 
day before yesterday, tomorrow is just another yesterday.  This is nicely illustrated in the 
book This time is different, in which authors analyze the history of financial defaults 
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from the beginning of 13
th
 century. It can be concluded that that subprime crises was 
everything but unique.  Second, much of the past is unknown.  Suppose the following 
operations: „1) Imagine an ice cube melting and envision the shape of the puddle then 2) 
consider the puddle of the water and reconstruct the shape of the ice cube‟
171
. Operation 
one being a forward process seems to be relatively easy compared to backward process 
of operation two, which is nonrepeatable and nonexperimental.  Taleb finds a parallel in 
the Iliad, where „Helenus, unlike other prophets predicted backwards without being given 
many details‟
172
  However, our world being extremistan, nonlinearity increases the 
complexity of the backward processes e.g. by taking into account the „butterfly in India 
paradigm‟
173
 and therefore accepting that the number of causes explaining what has been 
seen can be infinite (Bishop Huets problem of induction). Similar notion could be found 
in Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason: “If you suppose that everything that happens in the 
world is nothing but a result according to the laws of nature, then the causality of the 
cause will always in turn be something that happens; and this causality thus necessitates 
a regress to a still higher cause, and therefore necessitates a continuation of the series of 
conditions a parte priori without end. Mere causally active nature, therefore, is too large 
for any concept in the synthesis of events in the world. If you admit, in certain cases, 
spontaneously caused events, therefore generation from freedom, then by an unavoidable 
law of nature the question, Why?, still pursues you, and you are forced by the empirical 
law of causality to go beyond this point; and thus you find that any such totality of 
connection is too small for your necessary empirical concept.‖
174
 Then if the 
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interpretation of past can be misleading, how can we „reconstruct the shape of the ice 
cube?‟
175
Given that; how can a fiat dare to predict future? 
2.1.9. Conclusion 
To sum up, I have elaborated on the most obvious negative aspects accompanying 
economic growth of modern economies. First, I have elaborated on approaches dealing 
with the relationship between income and happiness concluding that as the income 
increases the correlation between to variables becomes lower. Second, considering the 
debt, I have dealt with our tendency to identify moral obligation with quantifiable sum of 
money and the consequent tendency to slip easily into sharp-edged market exchanges, 
that encompassing zero-sum games and competition for happiness are not what make us 
happy.  Third, I have examined the causes of sense of discontent as the driver of 
economic performance and therefore the obstacle for us to repose in stationary affluence, 
finding both internal reasons (by proponents of the Chicago School) on the one hand and 
external triggers such as „non-repressive hedonism‟
176
 on the other.  Fourth, I have 
examined our vulnerability to succumb to the sense of discontent; in particular the lack of 
capability to asses wealth in absolute terms and the loss of the harmony with nature, 
followed by questioning of the present-day nature of Rousseau‟s Social Contract in the 
context of development of new technologies taking into account the risk of positive 
notion of liberty. Fifth, for the analysis of the family decline as an adverse side of the 
economic growth, the perspective represented by Deidre McCloskey: ―the values 
communicated by economic writings are often more important that the research results 
themselves.‖
177
 was considered to be the point of departure for examination of Becker‟s 
imposition of economic analysis on the decision making in marriage and family. Sixth, I 
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have elaborated on Sen‟s capability approach emphasizing the role increasing our 
capabilities to be happy i.e. freedom. Sixth, I emphasized the role of unpredictable 
events. 
2.2. Hypothesis 2: Motivation of self-interest is not sufficient 
2.2.1. Introduction 
According to Amartya Sen, economic crisis has revealed the insufficiency of 
motivational narrowness of unrestrained self-interest based behaviour. Therefore, as an 
outcome, there is an increased demand for a new model of a successful society that 
embodies wider scope of motivations. As already mentioned, social sciences and 
economics in particular are „shaping the world they seek to describe‟
178
, as Robert Bellah 
points out: ―We can say that in contemporary society social science has usurped the 
traditional position of theology. It is now social science that tells us what kind of 
creatures we are and what we are about on this planet.‖
179
, therefore forming social 
expectations. With Adam Smith, being considered as a father of modern economics, 
Amartya Sen alleges, that Smith‟s thoughts does not provide only a relevant explanan of 
economic crisis but suggests the ways of its overcoming and building a new model of a 
decent society.   
Therefore, in this part of my thesis; first, I will analyze the concept of homo economicus 
as postulated by John Stuart Mill. Second, I will elaborate on thoughts of Bernard 
Mandeville. Third, Das Adam Smith Problem will be considered with emphasis on the 
motive of sympathy. Fourth, I will answer the following question: Can we really reckon 
the notion of self-interest as perceived by Adam Smith to be a virtue? by means of 
statements of Amartya Sen.  Fifth, I will elaborate on Smithian motive of courage in the 
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context of debate on overcoming the economic crisis. Sixth, I will deal with Smithian 
approach of reasoning with regard to the institutional arrangements.  
2.2.2. John Stuart Mill 
The creation of the concept homo economicus or economic man as we know it today is 
usually ascribed to the writings of John Stuart Mill, even though such a denomination 
can‟t be found in his texts. 
 According to Joseph Persky, the designation of economic man was established rather as 
a reaction to Mill‟s work acquiring negative connotation by proponents of historical 
school and Victorian moralist for ‗reductionists and amoral character of assumed model 
of human nature‘
180
 since Mill‟s political economy: ―does not treat at of the whole of 
man's nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. 
It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is 
capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.‖
181
;e.g. 
According to Persky, John Kells Ingram  belittled Mill‟s political economy that ”dealt 
not with real but with imaginary men—'economic men' ... conceived as simply 'money-
making animals'‖
182
. In a similar way, according to Persky, John Neville 
Keynesdelimited himself against Mill‟s: „‗economic man,' whose activities are 
determined solely by the desire for wealth…"
183
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Therefore, according to Carlos Rodrigues-Sickert, such an abstraction from human nature 
epitomizes devotion to: „material self-interest and instrumental rationality‟
184
.  The 
assumption of material-self interest can be found in particular in Bernard Mandville, who 
is sometimes considered to be the antecedent of Adam Smith and „on whose treatise Mill 
situates his work‟
185
.  Before elaborating on Mandeville‟s and Smith‟s thoughts, I would 
like to reconsider Kell‟s and Ingram‟s quotes.  
Even though according to Persky, Mill considered the introduction of a model covering 
the whole range of human motivations to be indeterminant, he alleges that reducing 
Mill‟s economic man to ―money-hungry monomaniac‖
186
 seem to be too simplistic 
since: “It [political economy] makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or 
motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing to the desire of 
wealth, namely, aversion to labour, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly 
indulgences.‖
187
 Therefore, Persky concluded that besides desire to accumulate, Mill‟s 
economic man desires leisure and luxury.  In addition, he mentions the interest in 
procreation in accordance with the ―principle of population‖
188
 
2.2.3. Bernard Mandeville 
Sedlacek claims that Mandeville with his Fable of the Bees could be regarded as the first 
who elaborated on ties among economics, well-being and morality. Therefore, the moral 
side of homo economicus could be ascribed to his social philosophy.  
                                                          
184
 RODRIGUEZ-SICKERT, Carlos (2009). Homo economicus. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile 
FACEA. Escuela de Administracion. Pg.3 
185
 RODRIGUEZ-SICKERT, Carlos (2009). Homo economicus. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile 
FACEA. Escuela de Administracion. Pg.3 
186
 INGRAM, John Kells (1888). A History of Political Economy. New York. Augustus M. Kelley. 1967. 
Quoted in PERSKY, J (1995). Retrospectives - The Ethology of Homo Economicus. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. Vol. 9, No.  2. Pg. 223 
187
 MILL, John Stuart (1836). On the definition of political economy, and on the Method of investigation 
proper to it.  London and Westminster Review. Quoted in PERSKY, J (1995). Retrospectives - The 
Ethology of Homo Economicus. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 9, No.  2. Pg. 224. 
188
 PERSKY, Joseph (1995). Retrospectives - The Ethology of Homo Economicus. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. Vol. 9, No.  2. Pages 223 
45 
 
Mandeville postulated that societal well-being is derived from vice defined as the 
combination of egoism (self-interest) and emotions, which according to him deserves to 
be scorned. Therefore, in economic language, Mandeville assumed that:”vice is a 
multiplier of effective demand, which becomes a driver for the economy‖.
189
 Sedlacek 
alleges that Mandeville‟s approach implies trade-off between morality and prosperity, 
conditioned on greed and „ever-growing demand‟
190
: ―Would you render a society of men 
strong and powerful, you must touch their passions …pride will set them to work in 
earnest… But would you have a frugal and honest Society, the best Policy is to preserve 
Men in their Native Simplicity,…..remove and keep from them everything that might raise 
their Desires, or improve their understanding…‖
191
  
2.2.4. Adam Smith’s self-interest as a virtue? 
According to Sedlacek Adam Smith is sometimes wrongly considered to be the successor 
of the Mandeville‟s thoughts. Nevertheless, in the Smith‟s first book; The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, Mandeville‟s social philosophy acquired negative connotation: ―There 
is however, another system which seems to take away altogether the distinction between 
vice and virtue, and of which the tendency is, upon that account, wholly pernicious: I 
mean the system of Dr. Mandeville‖.
192
 In particular, Smith condemns Mandeville‟s 
impossibility to ascribe virtue to self-interest: ―Man, he observes (Mandeville), is 
naturally much more interested in his own happiness than in that of others and it is 
impossible that in his heart he can ever really prefer their prosperity to his own.‖
193
, 
whereas in his second work, the Wealth of Nations, there are no references to Mandeville 
at all.  However, according to Butler, in Theory of Moral Sentiments, self-interest does 
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not refer to greed or selfishness, but rather the fact that we are concerned for our welfare, 
which is called prudence.
194
  It can be therefore concluded that in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, self-interest acquired virtuous connotation and unlike Mandeville, Smith 
highlights that not vice but virtue is benefiting society.   Nevertheless, according to Sen, 
it is not accurate to identify these two terms since Smith perceived prudence as a „union 
of the two qualities of reason and understanding and self-command‟.
195
 Therefore 
prudence represents broader motivation than self-love or self-interest.  
But can we really reckon the notion of self-interest as perceived by Adam Smith to be a 
virtue?  For the purpose of this thesis at roots of the consideration of this vexed question 
will be the statements by Amartya Sen, from whose point of view the consequantialist 
reasoning for answering the following questions is deemed too simplifying: „Was Smith 
recommending self-interested conduct to the extent it was successful in generating 
economic prosperity?  Does good action imply good consequences; is a good person the 
one who takes good action?‟
196
 
He alleges that a person can‟t be judged only by his usefulness i.e. in so far it achieves 
economic or other results, whereby he emphasizes that  Smith‟s conception of „the 
natural selfishness and rapacity‟
197
 despite being accompanied by achievement of good 
results does not make men virtuous or admirable as mentioned in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments: ―it seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of 
the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient or well-contrived building; 
or that we should have no other reason for praising a man than that for which we 
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commend a chest of drawers.‖
198
According to Sen, the role of motives should be 
emphasized referring again to the Theory of Moral Sentiments ―The man of the most 
perfect virtue, the man whom we naturally love and revere the most, is he who join, to 
the most perfect command of his own original and selfish feeling, the most exquisite 
sensibility both to the original and sympathetic feelings of others.‖
199
 
2.2.5. Das Adam Smith Problem 
According to Willson and Dixon, it was rather the Theory of Moral Sentiments that made 
Smith famous. However, the eminence of the Wealth of Nations degraded his first book 
to a afterword. There is an alleged conflict in Smith‟s two texts; between ―ethically 
conscious human being‖
200
 in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and ―self-interested 
character‖
201
 in the Wealth of Nations as assumed by Witztum. The discourse related to 
the inconsistency of the two texts is called „Das Adam Smith Problem‟ yet according to 
Wilson and Dixon, only few thinkers are convinced that his patterns of human behavior 
are contradictory.  
According to Wilson and Dixon, there is no rupture concerning the pattern of human 
behavior since both in the Wealth of Nations and Theories of Moral Sentiments, the 
guiding principle of the human behavior is sympathy.  They insist in that sympathy is 
considered to be an enabler of acting either out benevolence or self-interest. But what 
does Smith mean by sympathy and what is its relation to self-interest?  
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In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith assumes that: ―How selfish soever man may be 
supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the 
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing 
from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.‖
202
 Wilson and Dixon distinguish between broad 
(Smithian) and narrow definition of sympathy referred to as compassion.  They 
emphasize that the former as a „capacity inherent in human nature‟
203
 is not motivational, 
whereas the latter is. However, there are thinkers proposing their synthesis, making them 
both motivational. Who rejects such a „collapse‟ is Amos Witztum. 
As already suggested the points of departure of Witztum‟s discourse are two allegedly 
inconsistent representation of human nature: „ethically conscious human beings and 
apparently selfish character‟
204
. For him, it is not a problem since he concludes that 
depending on circumstances we are able to display both the „capacity to feel for others‟ 
and „pursue our own affairs‟:―Theory of Moral Sentiments is not about a single 
character. It is a book about how diverse tendencies and dispositions generate a system 
where ethical judgments and behavior interact.‖
205
 
Therefore, Willson and Dixon concluded that there is no inconsistency between the two 
texts. The fact that discourse in The Wealth of Nations is conditioned on the self-
interested behavior on one hand, where as in The Theory of Moral Sentiments on 
sympathy based behavior on the other, does only imply that in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, the sympathy as a „core capacity‟
206
 is expected. According to them, there is 
no reason to think that in The Wealth of Nations he changed his mind; as already 
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mentioned, no matter whether we act in the self-interest or interest of others, ―we are 
only able to act as we do because we are sympathizers‖.
207
  
However, being a sympathizer does not imply inherent altruism rather than egoism; ―It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their 
humanity but to their self-love.‖
208
 According to Wilson and Dixon we are capable of 
both „dispositions; it would be a surprise, if a child of baker or butcher could not expect a 
dinner from their benevolence‟
209
 since according to Smith: “How selfish soever man 
may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in 
the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives 
nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it‖
210
 
2.2.6. Adam Smith’s Courage 
Amarty Sen emphasizes the importance of considering other motives than Smith‟s 
pursuit of self-interest, as delineated in the Theory of Moral Sentiments that are often 
missing in the debates on the current economic crisis.   
Before elaborating on one of these motives of ‗ethically conscious human being‘
211
 as 
outlined in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, I would like to introduce Seven primary 
virtues by Thomas Aquinas, being a combination of „four pagan virtues including 
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„cardinal‟ virtues (courage, temperance, justice, and prudence) and three Christian virtues 
(faith, hope and love)‟.
212
 
McCloskey alleges that out of the Seven primary virtues, Smith chose all the cardinal and 
virtue of love to appraise. For the purpose of my thesis I would like to elaborate on the 
virtue of courage. Referring to Aristotle, Smith in the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
emphasizes that virtue in general “lies in a kind of middle between two opposite 
vices‖.
213
 Therefore, as stated in Smith text, the notion of courage or fortitude could be 
found in-between vice of cowardice and rashness.  
According to McCloskey, Smith‟s notion of courage combined with prudence yielding 
entrepreneurship acquired in Theory of Moral Sentiments rather negative connotation.  
As I see it, courage (not entrepreneurship) as a virtue is what is missing in the debates on 
overcoming of current economic crisis and building a new decent society. However, 
before elaborating on the particular reasons, I would like to clarify my point of departure 
for the following paragraphs, which might seem to be illogical at first sight; I hold the 
opinion that economic crisis can be seen as an externalization of the shortage of natural 
courage.  
From my point of view, the lack of courage closely related to what I have already 
elaborated on in chapter 2.1.5 i.e. the loss of harmony with nature and the subsequent 
„never-ending inner tension and the feeling of insufficiency‟
214
 is peculiar for our 
present-time form of social contract.  In my opinion, the general cowardice relates to our 
unwillingness to realize that „material success does not equate happiness‟
215
 with panic 
and return to our ideology when this quasi-religious belief is challenged. 
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Another consequence of joining the present form of social contract and the loss of 
harmony with nature can be seen in the loss of capability to do what we have reason to 
value, which in my opinion implies the quasi-religious belief already mentioned, wealth 
became valuable for its sake.   
2.2.7. Adam Smith’s Institutions 
As already mentioned in chapter 1.1.1., in Rousseau,  the wickedness of human nature is 
ascribable to the institutional designs. Therefore, the necessity to deal with new social 
arrangements preventing instability, inequality and poverty as elaborated in Smith‟s text 




According to Sen, there are two different approaches of reasoning with regard to the 
institutional arrangements; First, transcendental institutionalism, related to „contractian 
method of reasoning‟
218
 pursued by Jean Jacque Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and John 
Rawls, embodying attention on „identification of perfect justice rather than comparing of 
justice and injustice‟
219
, therefore not focused on the nature of emerging societies; 
second, comparative approaches, with concern for „realization focused comparisons‟
220
 
represented among others by Adam Smith.  To sum up, in the former, the primary 
question to be concentrated on is: ―How could we identify perfectly just institutions?‖
221
, 
whereas in the latter: ―How could justice be advanced?‖
222
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According to Sen, taking into consideration that today‟s theory of justice of the 
mainstream rests on the contractian tradition; Smithian approach stipulates fundamental 
change in the formulation of the theory of justice.  
Before elaborating on Smith‟s approach it should be mentioned that even though as Sen 
assumes Kant was familiar with the Theory of Moral Sentiments, he emphasized that:  
―Though reason is undoubtedly the source of the general rules of morality it is 
altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and 
wrong can be derived from reason.‖
223
 
At the heart of the Smith‟s approach of reasoning lies the device of impartial spectator 
since it allows options not possible in the contractian approach, including; comparative 
assessments, social realizations and removal of particular causes of injustice.  The 
impartial spectator is a device referred to as: ―reason, principle, conscience, the 
inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct.‖
224
 





To sum up, I have elaborated on the moral side of homo economicus with the main aim 
to reconsider its limited motivational scope; first, I pointed out, tracing back to the 
subject of economic man as designed by John Stuart Mill, according to whom the 
introduction of wider range of motives would be unnecessary, that besides drive for 
accumulation, Mills economic men has other three interests: „leisure, luxury and 
procreation‟
226
Second, I elaborated on the assumption of material self-interest that can be 
found in Bernard Mandeville, who presupposed vice-expressed self-interest to be “a 
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multiplier of effective demand, which becomes a driver for the economy‖.
227
 Third, since 
„Mill situated its treatise on Adam Smith‟
228
 work, who is sometimes regarded wrongly 
as successor of Mandeville thoughts with only one of his principle works taken into 
account I found it necessary to emphasize that unlike Mandeville, Smith points out that 
self-interest does not refer to greed or selfishness but rather to the fact that we have 
concern for our welfare and therefore acquires positive connotation. However, Amartya 
Sen concludes that the consequeantialist reasoning is not sufficient and referring to Smith 
emphasizes the role of other motives such as sympathy. Fourth, I considered the alleged 
incoherence between two Smith‟ texts: The Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral 
Sentiments with the following conclusion: even though the former represents “apparently 
selfish character”
229
, whereas the latter ―ethically conscious human being”
230
, the 
guiding motive of the human behavior in both texts is sympathy.  Fifth, I have elaborated 
on the neglect of one particular motive of the Seven Primary Virtues by Aquinas outlined 
in the Theory of Moral Sentiments – courage and its implications. I concluded that lack 
of courage as a consequence of the present form of Social Contract i.e. loss of harmony 
with nature is externalized in the quasi religious belief of identifying material success 
with happiness, furthermore I elaborated on the capability approach with emphasizing 
opportunities such as good health rather than means.  Sixth, I have juxtaposed 
transcendental institutionalism related to contractian method of reasoning, and 
comparative approach with emphasis on Smith‟s concept of impartial spectator. 
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2.3. Hypothesis 3: We don’t know what our preferences are 
2.3.1. Introduction 
Instrumental rationality of economic man as mentioned in the previous chapter 
presupposes given set of preferences with the following hypothesis; „stability over time 
and exogeneity.‟
231
  Since economic crisis got to the foreground of the debate behavioral 
economics, for the purpose of my thesis, I will elaborate on the hypothesis of exogeneity 
by considering the arguments of Dan Ariely given the following question: „Do we 
systematically repeat certain mistakes?‟
232
 
As I see it, given that ―consumer debt is the lifeblood of our economy‖
233
, Ariely‟s 
concepts could provide a relevant explanan of economic crisis and suggest the way of its 
overcoming and building a new model of decent society. 
Therefore, in this chapter, first, I will deal with our inability to „choose things in absolute 
terms‟.
234
 Second, the concepts of anchoring, arbitrary coherence, herding, self-herding 
and affective forecasting will be mentioned.  Third, I will elaborate on the implications of 
concepts listed above on the market decision making. 
2.3.2. ‘Decoy-effect’ 
Dan Ariely, as I already mentioned, touches the axiom of transitivity by emphasizing that 
men seldom make decisions in absolute terms; ―We don't have an internal value meter 
that tells us how much things are worth. Rather, we focus on the relative advantage of 
one thing over another, and estimate value accordingly.―
235
  In addition there is an 
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aspect of relativity that makes us juxtapose rather things that are locally available and 
easily comparable, which Ariely refers to the „decoy-effect„
236
: 
We have two options A-B, each better equally on different attribute making the choice 
difficult‟.  Introducing of a new option A-, the decoy that is an inferior version of A 
makes option A look better not only to itself but in overall.  
From my point of view, besides having a triplet of options with a decoy, rather the 
sequence of their introduction plays a decisive role. Therefore, in the following few 
paragraphs I would like to deal with the following question: How does our first decision 
translate into long-term habits?   
2.3.3. Imprinting & Arbitrary Coherence 
Ariely applies the natural phenomenon of imprinting i.e. „sticking to initial decisions 
based on what‟s available in the environment‟
237
 to human behavior, in particular when 
accepting first price when we confront ourselves to a new product i.e. anchoring.  
Therefore, according to him, „our first decision over the price is imprinted in a long 
sequence of further decisions.‟
238
 
With reference to anchoring, Ariely introduces the term „arbitrary coherence‟
239
, 
comprehending that initial prices that we become anchored to (by buying a product) are 
to great extent arbitrary and influences the present and future prices we are ready to pay 
for similar products, making them coherent. 
But what processes transpose our first decision into a long sequence of future decisions?  
According to Ariely, an explanan is the general pattern of human conduct referred to as 
herding implying that we follow the example of other people‟s behavior and its particular 
form – self-herding pointing out to the situation when our present decisions follow the 
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suit of our past conduct without the latter being questioned.  In my opinion, self-herding 
relates closely to the concepts of „anticipated utility and affective forecasting‟
240
 invented 
by Danny Kahneman and Daniel Gilbert implying that that we don‟t learn recursively 
from past events, in other words, we are not able to consider our past errors in predicting 
future affective states. 
241
 
2.3.4. Cogito ergo sum 
In this subchapter I would like to elaborate briefly on the implications of arbitrary 
coherence and anchoring on market decision making. 
First, Ariely points out to oversimplification of economic models:  orthodox economic 
view holds that supply and demand are independent forces whose interactions generate 
prices of goods.  His experiments demonstrate that relationships between market forces 
are not conditioned on preferences but on our memory and ―the desire for coherence 
with our past decisions‖
242
 Therefore, according to him, it could not be concluded that 
market forces are independent since anchoring comes from supply side. 
Second, Ariely undermines the efficiency of free exchange in the following way; since 
our choices are affected by random anchors and arbitrary coherence, they can‟t be an 
accurate reflection of real pleasure we gain from the goods.  
2.3.5. Conclusion 
Taking into account the statements listed above, we don‟t necessarily have a sense of 
what a product or service is worth for the following reasons; first, our „ability to choose 
things in absolute terms‟
243
 is limited since we rather „estimate value accordingly‟
244
 and 
condition our decisions on comparisons with „decoys‟
245
, i.e. inferior versions of one of 
the two options.  Second, referring to the concept arbitrary coherence, we tend to 
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transpose first arbitrary decisions into long-term habits, making them coherent. But how 
does our first mistake translate into sequence of further decisions? Ariely emphasizes that 
we follow the suit of other people‟s conduct referred to as herding and its particular 
version self-herding i.e. following our own past behavior. Moreover, we „are not able to 
consider our past errors in predicting future affective states‟. 
To sum up, Ariely‟s experiments demonstrate that in the „framework of arbitrary 
coherence‟
246
 the market relations are conditioned not on our preferences but rather on 
our memory and self-herding behavior. Therefore; since our choices are affected by 
random anchors, they can‟t be an accurate reflection of real pleasure we gain from the 
goods. Moreover, I wouldn‟t say that the concepts listed above neglect the hypothesis of 
exogeneity, rather emphasizes that our behavior is the implication of our first arbitrary 
decisions that is determined by supply side.  
3. Conclusion  
3.1. Economic growth 
Since the perception of success is mirrored in the value system of individuals and 
societies, I have elaborated on the ills accompanying and conditioning economic growth 
with the main aim to contribute to the debate on the alternative measure to GDP.  
The point of departure for the proposed measures of the index is the alleged misbalance 
in the Ariely‟s dichotomy of the sharp market and fuzzy social norms with the former 
being in the default mode.     
Therefore, taking into account the negative aspects of economic growth, the following 
measures should be in my opinion considered in creating new model for a successful 
society: Income/debt ratio, sense of content and feeling of sufficiency, access to 
„wilderness‟, leisure time, connectedness of joy and unhappiness, decommoditization of 
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family, capability to do what we have reason to value (health and fitness), opportunity to 
do what we have reason to value and attitude towards future.  
3.2. Human nature 
Considering the impact of the crisis on our perception of human nature, the point of 
departure is the statement that social science and economics especially „shapes the world 
it seeks to describe‟.
247
 Furthermore, I took into consideration Amartya Sen‟s statement 
emphasizing that economic crisis revealed the insufficiency of motivational narrowness 
of unrestrained self-interested behaviour with the subsequent increased demand for a new 
model of a successful society that embodies wider range of motivations. 
Orthodox economic view presupposes reductionist model of economic men that 
epitomizes devotion to: „material self-interest and instrumental rationality‟
248
 with the 
former assumption traced back to Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith.  In Mandeville 
self-interest acquired the connotation of greed and selfishness, in my opinion peculiar for 
present time.  
Adam Smith wrote two books: Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations. The 
former (degraded to the status of afterword) represents ―ethically conscious human 
being‖
249
 whereas the latter „apparently selfish character‖.
250
 Nevertheless, the guiding 
principle of behavior in both texts is natural feeling for others i.e. sympathy.  Similarly, 
in Rousseau, the endowment of compassion is presupposed.   
Moreover, besides prudence, Smith emphasized four other virtues including courage. I 
hold opinion that economic crisis a product of herding can be seen as an externalization 
of the shortage of courage, an outcome of loss harmony with nature. Therefore, taking 
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into account the humanist inheritance of Rousseau, the prospective debate concerning 
motivational narrowness of self-interest given the virtue set in Adam Smith‟s might 
cause the revival Rousseau‟s humanist legacy, including his affective potentiality of 
compassion and his call „back to nature‟ avoiding the present-day subjection of physical 
independence. In addition to that, considering Kant, in Theory of Moral Sentiments we 
can find the following statement: ―Though reason is undoubtedly the source of the 
general rules of morality it is altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the 
first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from reason.‖
251
 
Furthermore, Rousseau assumed that ―man is naturally good, and that it is solely by our 
institutions that men become wicked.
252
 Similarly, in Kant, the ―natural propensity 
towards Evil‖
253
 is not ascribed to animal or rational nature but to the social 
arrangements. Nowadays, the theory of justice is dominated by „contractian method of 
reasoning‟
254
 that embodies attention on design of perfectly just institutions.  The 
alternative, comparative approach whose proponent was Adam Smith rather focused on 
social realizations with the device of impartial spectator might stipulate fundamental 
change in the formulation in the theory of justice.  
3.3. Freedom 
As I see it, economic crisis can be perceived as the externalization of the lack of Kantian 
perception of freedom that is in my opinion epitomized in the hypothesis of exogeniety 
of the preference set of economic man.  
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Therefore, Ariely‟s comment on Decartes‟ Cogito ergo sum: ―suppose we are nothing 
more than the sum of our first, naive, random behaviors‖
255
 and its implication on the 
notion of freedom shouldn‟t be missing in the debate on overcoming economic crisis. 
Ariely, behavioral economist, presupposes that our initial random decisions, determined 
by supply side are transposed into long-term habits by means of herding i.e. following 
the suit of other peoples‟ behavior.  However, in Kant, moral agent is considered to be 
practically free in case her ―proper self‖
256
 is not coerced by external forces. Similar 
attitude can be found in Nicomachean ethics by a man being taken away by the wind 
making his acting involuntary.
257
 
Besides herding, Ariely elaborates on self-herding pointing out to the situation when our 
present decisions follow the suit of our past conduct without the latter being questioned. 
In Kant, the response to the question: “How can I avoid being caused externally?‖
258
 lies 
in causal spontaneity as a notion of freedom reminiscent of Aristotle‟s unmoved mover 
“that which moves without being moved”.
259
 
Therefore, the effort to overcome economic crisis and build a new model of a dense 
society might imply the revival of Kantian humanist legacy of freedom by questioning 
the hypothesis of exogenous set of preferences since in the framework of arbitrary 
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